

ole 74-1523
15 JUL 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel

ATTENTION :

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SUBJECT : Draft Letter Re H. R. 14135

1. Our only suggestion is that paragraph c. be deleted. The Directorate of Intelligence, of course, is the component which would be affected most, and we would defer to its judgment on the matter. It is our opinion, however, that the paragraph is both unnecessary and not entirely accurate.

2. It is true that espionage methods and the human sources involved are seldom revealed in finished intelligence studies. It is almost impossible, on the other hand, to conceal the technical means of collection for that information derived from sensitive compartmented systems. Even if the sources and methods of gathering data are not made evident through the text and/or graphics, they can be deduced; there is simply no other way in which the information could have been obtained.

3. Non-codeword finished intelligence may also, if disclosed, reveal sensitive methods to the opposition and thus lead to countermeasures. Methods of extrapolation of data, the use of modeling techniques, etc., are examples that readily come to mind. There is also the obligation to protect indefinitely classified information received through liaison with foreign intelligence services. The foreign governments involved would be alarmed over the prospect that the United States proposed to unilaterally declassify finished intelligence based on information provided by them upon the expiration of 25 years.

4. To the degree that paragraph c. implies that the Agency would provide the National Resource Information System with copies of its finished intelligence on foreign resources, it limits the DCI's future options. It would be preferable, therefore, from the standpoint of security, if no commitment, implicit or explicit, were made to contribute data to the system.

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Chief, Information Analysis Staff